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NOTE
THE USE OF EXPERT EVIDENCE IN RES IPSA LOQUITUR
CASES
INTRODUCTION
"[W] hen through any instrumentality or agency under the man-
agement or control of a defendant or his servants there is an occurrence,
injurious to the plaintiff, which in the ordinary course of things would
not take place if the person in control were exercising due care, the
occurrence itself, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, affords
. . . evidence that there was want of due care." 1
This doctrine, prompted by common sense,2 has been known for nearly
a century as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.3 Its meaning, literally "the
thing speaks for itself," is simply that the fact that the accident occurred
is sufficient to afford some evidence that the defendant was negligent.4
Res ipsa loquitur is a form of circumstantial evidence,5 based on the
premise that from the past experience or common sense of the trier of fact
the event which resulted in the plaintiff's injury does not ordinarily happen
in the absence of negligence. 6 Often, however, there is no basis of common
1. Mumma v. Easton & A. R.R., 73 N.J.L. 653, 658, 65 Atl. 208, 210 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1905); see 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 19.5 (1956) (hereinafter cited as
HARPW & JAMs). For an excellent discussion of the general principles of res ipsa
loquitur, far less provincial than its title might indicate, see Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur
in California, 37 CsAi. L. Ri. 183 (1949).
2. See C. MoRRs, Toa Ts 129-30 (1953) (hereinafter cited as Momuus).
3. The term was first uttered in a negligence case by Baron Pollock in Byrne v.
Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863), and has been commonly associated
with cases in which the mere fact that an accident has taken place is said to con-
stitute evidence of negligence. Prosser, supra note 1, at 184; see MoRi-s at 129-30.
Although most American jurisdictions recognize the doctrine, Pennsylvania limits it
to cases involving common carriers or public utilities. Seeraty v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 198 F.2d 264, 265 (3d Cir. 1952). The doctrine is not applied in
Michigan. Balance v. Dunnington, 241 Mich. 383, 217 N.W. 329 (1928).
The use of the Latin term has often been criticized. PRossER, TORTS § 42, at 201
n.83 (2d ed. 1955); see also Gray v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 24 F.2d 671, 672 (7th
Cir. 1928).
4. Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CAsun. L. RZv. 183, 190-91 (1949).
Courts are divided regarding the weight to be given the doctrine. See note 11 inffra.
5. Prosser, supra note 4, at 189; see 2 HARxm & JAMsS § 19.5. It should be
recognized that the doctrine is only one form of circumstantial evidence, and in many
cases other evidence of this general class can be introduced even though the doctrine
is inapplicable or not recognized in the jurisdiction. See Francisco v. Miller, 14 N.J.
Super. 290, 296, 81 A.2d 803, 806 (App. Div. 1951); Annot., 141 A.L.R. 1016, 1018
(1942).
6. Prosser, supra note 4, at 191; Interview with Norman Goldberg, Ph. D.,
Professor of Physics, University of Pennsylvania, October 22, 1957 (hereinafter cited
as GoLnBERG INTZM VW).
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knowledge upon which either judge or juror can determine whether or not
the occurrence which gave rise to the cause of action would ordinarily have
taken place in the absence of negligence on the defendant's part. Typically,
the applicability of the doctrine in such cases is one of conjecture on the
part of the court. This approach overlooks the modern trend toward use
of expert evidence,7 which has led to more enlightened decisions and verdicts
on the part of judge and jury.8
It would seem that expert evidence might well be introduced by either
party to afford a foundation, or demonstrate the lack thereof, for applica-
tion of the doctrine of res ips loquitur where a layman cannot really say
that the thing does or does not speak for itself.9 Similarly, such evidence
might also be used by the plaintiff where the doctrine is applicable, to show
specific acts of negligence on the defendant's part. Conversely, the defend-
ant might introduce expert testimony to indicate that he was not negligent
in the particular case at hand, even though the doctrine would ordinarily
be applicable to a similar factual situation. It will be the object of this
Note to explore these possibilities of using evidence of an expert nature in
res ipsa loquitur cases.10
THE UsE OF EXPERT EVIDENCE To DETERmINE WHETTHER RES IPSA
LOQUITUR SHOULD BE INVOKED IN A GIVEN FACTUAL SITUATION
The applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is of vital im-
portance to both parties. When invoked, proof of occurrence of the accident
which gave rise to the injury suffices to take the case to the jury," which
7. The term "expert evidence" as used in this Note includes within its scope
scientific and statistical evidence, which, in effect, are merely specialized forms of this
general category of proof.
8. See Averbach, Finding an Expert for Your Case, Practical Lawyer, April 1957,
p. 77. This article presents an invaluable directory of potential sources of expert
testimony.
9. See 2 HARPER & JAMES § 19.6, at 1082-83 & n.12; PRossER, TORTS § 42, at
202 (2d ed. 1955) ; S. Morris, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Texas, 26 TZXAs L. Rzv. 257,
761, 776-77 (1948).
10. In many jurisdictions, res ipsa loquitur is said to apply in an action against
a common carrier arising out of a collision with another vehicle or object. Momus at
130; PRossER, op. cit. supra note 9, § 42 at 201. The use of the doctrine in this area,
however, is more a reflection of the greater burden of proof required of carrier-de-
fendants than of any probability that the result stemmed from the defendant's negli-
gence. Ibid. For that reason, these carrier cases will not be considered in this Note.
11. 2 HARPER & JAMES § 19.11, at 1099; Moaais at 135-36; Annot., 153 A.L.R.
1134, 1136 (1944). Some courts treat res ipsa loqudtur as creating a presumption of
negligence in the sense that the burden of coming forward with evidence of due care
is shifted to the defendant; once he does so, the burden of proof remains upon the
plaintiff. A few courts treat the doctrine as creating a full presumption of negligence,
shifting to the defendant the burden of proof as well as that of coming forward with
evidence in his favor. A majority of the courts, however, treat the doctrine as per-
mitting, but not compelling, an inference of negligence; it is sufficient to support a
verdict for the plaintiff, but neither compels such a verdict nor relieves the plaintiff
of the burden of proof, even though the defendant might offer no evidence in his
behalf. See 2 HARPER & JAMES § 19.11; MoRRis at 135-38; PROSsER, TORTS § 42, at
211-13 (2d ed. 1955); Comment, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Kansas, 5 KAN. L. Rxv. 88,
92-93 (1956).
EXPERT EVIDENCE AND RES IPSA LOQUITUR
is apt to be sympathetic toward the injured plaintiff.'2 Thus, misapplica-
tion may be prejudicial to the defendant.'8 On the other hand, a worthy
plaintiff who was in fact injured as a result of defendant's negligence may
have no proof other than the happening of the event which injured him.14
An unwarranted refusal on the part of the court to apply res ipsa loquitur
will mean that his case must be dismissed.
There is disagreement as to the degree of probability that the accident
resulted from defendant's negligence necessary to permit application of
the doctrine. A majority of courts require only a strong probability that
the accident would not have occurred in the absence of defendant's negli-
gence; the plaintiff need not exclude every other possible cause.15 A few
courts insist that the doctrine can be applied only if it was almost impossible
for the accident to have occurred had the defendant not been negligent.16
In many instances, the facts clearly demonstrate that someone has
been negligent, and res ipsa loquitur has properly been applied by the courts
even in the absence of expert testimony. 17 Thus, when a plaintiff is injured
by falling plaster, a majority of courts apply res ipsa loquitur in the absence
of some explanation for the cause of the accident.' 8  These decisions seem
consistent with scientific theory.'9 Likewise, the doctrine has been applied,
12. 2 HARER & JAMES at 1099.
13. Ibid. See Comment, 39 Ky. L.J. 328, 330-31 (1951).
14. Some courts stress this point. Thus, they refuse to allow the doctrine to be
applied when specific acts of negligence are alleged or proved. 2 HARPER & JAMEs §
19.10; MORRIS at 131-32; see text and notes at notes 94-103 infra. A majority of
courts, however, permit the plaintiff to avail himself of the doctrine, even though
specific acts of negligence are alleged or proved. 2 HAR R & JAMES § 19.10; see
text and note at note 100 infra. Similar considerations induce a few courts to refuse
to allow res ipsa loquitur to be applied unless evidence of the cause of the accident
is more accessible to defendant than to plaintiff. See Dorman v. T. Smith & Son, Inc.,
223 La. 29, 45-46, 64 So. 2d 833, 835 (1953) ; Francisco v. Miller, 14 N.J. Super. 290,
295, 81 A.2d 803, 805-06 (App. Div. 1951); 3 STEVXlSON, NEGLIGENCE IN THE ATr-
LAlrlc STATES § 911 (1954). But see 2 HAmR & JAMES § 19.9; PROSSER, op. cit. supra
note 9, § 42 at 209.
15. Goldin, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Aviation Law, 18 So. CALIW.
L. REv. 15, 21 (1944) ; Note, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 543, 546 (1952) ; cf. PRossEI, Res Ipsa
Loquitur in California, 37 CALnr. L. RZv. 183, 194-95 (1949) (probability such that a
reasonable man might infer negligence).
16. Note, 37 CoRNELL L.Q. 543, 546 (1952). This approach has been criticized on
the ground that it is almost impossible to find a case where there are no alternative
possible causes of the accident. It is said that where alternative explanations are pres-
ented, ". . . it is for the jury to say whether ... the most probable explanation is
negligence. .. ." Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur it California, 37 CAI". L. RZv. 183, 195-
96 (1949).
17. For examples, see id. at 192.
18. E.g., Windas v. Galston & Sutton Theaters, Inc., 35 Cal. App. 2d 533, 96 P.2d
170 (1939); Law v. Morris, 102 N.J.L. 650, 133 Atl. 427 (Ct. Err. & App. 1926);
Morris v. Zimmerman, 138 App. Div. 114, 122 N.Y. Supp. 900 (1st Dep't 1910); see
Prosser, supra note 16, at 195; Shain, Res Ipsa Loquitur, 17 So. CALV. L. Rzv. 187,
197 (1944) ; Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 643, 650-52 (1952). Contra, Thompson v. Cooles, 37
Del. (7 W.W. Harr.) 83, 92, 180 AtL. 522, 526 (Super. Ct. 1937) ("There was no
evidence that the ceiling had ever been in a condition that required the defendants to
repair it or of notice to defendants that it was out of repair, or that there is any means
by which a person can ascertain when a ceiling is about to fall.").
19. "Obviously, if an earthquake occurs, the owner should not be liable. But
ordinarily, if plaster falls, it is because it is old, and the occurrence can usually
be predicted." GoLDsgRG INTsRvIZW.
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even in the absence of expert testimony, where an explosive has unaccount-
ably gone off while in the hands of its prospective user; 20 this result also
seems to have a valid factual base. 21 On the ground that even a layman is
able to say as a matter of common knowledge and observation that sponges
should not be left in patients following operations if there has been careful
professional treatment,2 res ipsa loquitur is applied to cases where a
patient suffers injuries as a result of a sponge having been left in his
bodyY3 Since such a result is unlikely to occur if standard operative pro-
cedure is followed,24 it would seem proper to apply the doctrine in such
cases, thus shifting at least a portion of the evidentiary burden away from
the plaintiff; 5 a doctor who has followed careful operative procedure is,
of course, free to produce evidence to this effect, and since the standard
of care required of a physician is that followed by other doctors in his
locale,2 a careful physician should be able to offset the effect of the doctrine
even if it is used against him.
On the other hand, there are some cases in which the court's inexpert
evaluation of the likelihood that the accident was caused by defendant's
20. E.g., Rathbun v. White, 157 Cal. 248, 107 Pac. 309 (1910); Shan, supra
note 18, at 221.
21. Letter from N. G. Johnson, Technical Specialist, E. I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Nov. 27, 1957, on file in Biddle
Law Library; GoLDBtRG INTMfviw. Dr. Goldberg does pose the hypothetical case
of an unexplained nuclear explosion, which might possibly be set off by a cosmic ray,
beyond anyone's control. It would seem that res ipsa loquitur should not be applied
to such a situation. Cf. American Alliance Ins. Co. v. Keleket X-Ray Corp., 248 F.2d
920 (6th Cir. 1957).
22. Res ipsa loquitur is not ordinarily applied against the physician in malprac-
tice cases; the plaintiff in such cases is usually required to produce specific evidence
through expert testimony to prove the physician's lack of care. However, the doctrine
may be applied where "the undesirable result is such that it is evident even to a lay-
man" that it would "not have occurred except for the doctor's negligence." Johnston
v. Rodis, 151 F. Supp. 345, 348 (D.D.C. 1957) ; see Engelking v. Carlson, 13 Cal. 2d
216, 221, 88 P.2d 695, 697-98 (1939) ; Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied: The
Silent Medical Treatment, 1 VILIANOVA L. Rsv. 250, 268-69 (1956) ; Prosser, supra
note 16, at 210-11; 9 BROOKxLY L. Ray. 335 passim (1940).
23. E.g., Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal. 2d 82, 64 P.2d 409 (1936) ; Mitchell v. Saunders,
219 N.C. 178, 13 S.E.2d 242 (1941) ; PRossER, ToRts § 42, at 210 (2d ed. 1955) ; Note,
18 Miss. L.J. 448, 452 (1947); 40 CoLum. L. Ray. 161, 163 (1940).
24. There are certain basic procedures which are followed by a careful surgeon
with regard to the use of sponges in the course of operative procedure. Standard oper-
ating room practice is now formalized. The surgeon is responsible for the number of
sponges available for use during the operation. He must either count them personally
or accept the statement of one qualified to do so, such as the nurse assisting him. He
should also use a technique in which it is not a simple matter to overlook a sponge.
The sponge should contain some matter discernible to the X-ray, and there should
be a tape on the sponge which hangs outside of the wound. At the end of the opera-
tion and before the wound is closed, the surgeon is responsible for taking a sponge
count, which must agree with that previously made. The number of sponges should
not be left to memory, but a blackboard in the operating room should itemize by types
the sponges to be accounted for. Some ultra-conservative institutions have two
persons taking the sponge counts. Interview with Dr. I. S. Ravdin, John Rhea
Barton Professor of Surgery, School of Medicine, University of Pennsylvania,
Chairman, Board of Regents, American College of Surgeons, Nov. 21, 1957 (herein-
after cited as RAvoiN IN V niviW). See Ales v. Ryan, supra note 23 (no accurate
sponge count taken; no safety appliance used on sponge).
25. See note 11 supra.
26. Johnston v. Rodis, 151 F. Supp. 345, 346 (D.D.C. 1957); 9 BRooxLYN L.
REv. 335 (1940).
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negligence resulted in a decision which was probably not in accord with
the actual facts. Thus, in Stanolind v. Lambert, 7 plaintiff's water well
became filled with sand following a nearby explosion of dynamite by de-
fendants. The appellate court reversed a decision for plaintiff, holding
that "the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot be given such broad applica-
tion as to permit negligence and proximate cause issues to be inferred
simply from the setting off of an explosive charge and damage to a well
or cistern." 2 8 Yet, the damage to plaintiff's wells followed too closely upon
the heels of the explosion to be attributable merely to an act of God; an
examination of the geographical strata in the area of the blast might have
enabled the defendant to predict the ensuing result from his blasting
operations.2 Scientific evidence to this effect could have convinced the
court that res ipsa loquitur was properly applicable, and might have saved
this case for the plaintiff. 0 In DeCicco v. Marlou Holding Co.,3 the
court applied res ipsa loquitur and permitted a jury sympathetic to the
plaintiff to decide a case, even though there was no scientific basis for
application of the doctrine. Plaintiff was killed by a piece of defendant's
building which struck him during a hurricane. The court pointed out that
"a fallen object is the common circumstance calling for the invocation and
application of the doctrine," 32 and held that the possibility that the accident
might have been caused by the storm was a question for the jury. Expert
evidence as to the effect of winds of hurricane force upon a structure such
as defendant's might have convinced the court that the accident did result
from an act of God, and thereby precluded application of the doctrine. In
the recent case of Henthorn z. M.G.C. Corp.,3 plaintiff was injured when
his truck skidded into defendant's tractor-trailer unit which was blocking
the highway during a blinding snow storm. A statute forbade a vehicle
from blocking the highway unless disabled "in such a manner . . . that
it is impossible to avoid stopping . . . in such a position." 3 4 Defendant's
driver was killed instantly by the impact, and there was no direct evidence
as to why his truck was blocking the road. The court, referring to the
above statute, held the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to be applicable, not-
withstanding the defendant's position that the truck might have skidded
without the fault of its driver into a position from which it could not be
27. 222 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
28. Id. at 126. Texas is one of those jurisdictions which requires some showing
of negligence in order to charge a party for damages resulting from vibrations or
concussions in blasting operations. Other jurisdictions hold the blaster liable for all
such damage regardless of his negligence. 21 Miss. L.J. 289, 290 (1950) ; Annot., 20
A.L.R.2d 1372 (1951).
29. GOLDB-RG IN MRVgW.
30. The court indicated that it might have applied res ipsa had expert testimony
been introduced: "In a case such as this, the matter is one for proof and cannot be
supplied by common knowledge, as it is in some res ipsa loquitur cases." 222 S.W.2d
at 127.
31. 24 N.J. Misc. 3, 44 A.2d 898 (Cir. Ct. 1945).
32. Id. at 4, 44 A2d at 899.
33. 1 Wis. 2d 180, 83 N.W.2d 759 (1957).
34. Wis. STAT. ANx. § 85.19 (8) (West 1957).
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moved. This contention was not supported by expert testimony; had it
been, it is possible that the doctrine would have been held inapplicable.3 5
Thus, it can be seen that the absence of expert evidence may be
extremely harmful to a plaintiff or a defendant when the court is ponder-
ing the applicability of res ipsa loquitur to a given factual situation. This
is especially true when the accident is unique. Of course, once a court
rules upon the applicability of the doctrine on the basis of expert testimony,
this precedent serves as some assurance that- such testimony will not be
needed in similar cases arising in the future in the same jurisdiction.
3 6
Cases Where Plaintiff's Expert Evidence Resulted in Application
of Res lpsa Loquitur-
Some plaintiffs have successfully- used expert testimony to convince.
the court that the facts did speak for themselves. These .plaintiffs were,
able to get their cases to the jury. Of course, the effect of such. authorita-,
tive testimony upon the jury was also helpful. In the majority of these
cases, there was a verdict for the plaintiff. One of the earliest examples
of this sort of trial strategy was Judson v. Giant Powder Co.3 7 An explo-
sion completely destroyed defendant's nitroglycerine factory, and damaged
plaintiff's property as well. No direct evidence as to the cause of the
explosion was available, for "the witnesses who saw and knew . - . were
scattered to the four winds." 38 Res ipsa loquitur was held applicable
on the basis of expert evidence produced by plaintiff indicating 'that if the
process of manufacturing and handling the explosives had been properly
carried out, the explosion would not have occurred.3 9
In Hanaman v. New York Tel. Co.,40 plaintiff successfully withstood
a motion for a nonsuit by introducing testimony that the electric shock
which he suffered while using telephone equipment supplied and serviced
by defendant was due to the latter's negligence.41 Similarly, in Buffam.'s
v. City of Long Beach,42 expert testimony enabled the plaintiff to avail
himself of the res ipsa doctrine by indicating that a water main which burst
would not have done so had it been properly cared for and maintained.
35. In general, the mere fact that an automobile skids on a slippery highway does
not render the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applicable. Annot., 113 A.L.R. 1002 (1938)
(cases cited therein).
36. See MoRRIs at 133.
37. 107 Cal. 549, 40 Pac. 1020 (1895).
38. Id. at 553, 40 Pac. at 1020.
39. But see 2 HARPER & JAMES § 19.6, at 1083 n.15: "This attitude suggests that
the court was not really concerned so much with examining the probabilities of
negligence as with fixing liability for injury from a dangerous activity."
40. 278 App. Div. 875, 104 N.Y.S.2d 315 (3d Dep't 1951).
41. Although res ispa loquitur was not referred to by name, the court in effect
applied the doctrine.
42. 111 Cal. App. 327, 295 Pac. 540 (1931). See also McCray v. Galveston, H.
& S.A. Ry., 89 Tex. 168, 34 S.W. 95 (1896) (exclusion of expert testimony that
rails that fell on plaintiff would not have done so if properly stacked held erroneous,
and res ipsa loquitur held applicable).
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And in a series of recent California malpractice cases,4 3 the courts held
res ipsa loquitur to be applicable on the basis of expert testimony, even
though the result of professional care was not such as would enable a layman
to say as a matter of common knowledge that due care had not been
exercised."4
Cases Where Defendant's Expert Evidence Precluded the
-Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur
Conversely, defendants have been able to preclude use of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, and thus keep a case away from an often hostile jury
by showing through experts that the accident was likely to have occurred
even in the absence of negligence. 45 In Texiis & N. 0. R.R. v. Schreiber,46
the appellate court reversed a verdict for plaintiff and held that the case
was improperly submitted, on the basis of res ipsa loquitur. In that
case, plaintiff's home was damaged by, smoke, soot, and oil emitted
from defendant's locomotive. Testimony of the railroad's master mechanic
indicated that such a result will occur in the usual course of locomotive
operation, even though proper care may be used. In Lehner v. McLennan,47
res ipsa loquitur was not applied where trees of a counter-claiming defend-
ant were injured following fumigation by the plaintiff. The plaintiff had
introduced expert testimony to the effect that such injuries could result
even if the job were conducted in the safest possible manner.
It is perhaps in the malpractice cases that expert testimony can most
effectively be used by'a defendant to show that res ipsa loquitur is inap-
plicable to the factual situation at hand. The doctrine is traditionally
applied only in those medical cases in which a layman could say as a matter
of common knowledge that the result of the treatment would not have oc-
curred in the absence of negligence.48 However, there are many instances
where an undesirable result of treatment may occur in the absence of
negligence, "common knowledge" of the layman notwithstanding. For
example, it has been indicated that the doctrine might be applied against
a surgeon who knocks out a tooth during a tonsillectomy.49 Yet, it is
possible in some operations of this sort, that the patient's tongue may drop
backward and interfere with his breathing; the insertion of an instrument
in the patient's mouth to correct this condition can result in dislodgement
43. Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955) ; Sherman v. Hartman,
137 Cal. App. 2d 589, 290 P.2d 894 (1955); Costa v. Board of Regents, 116 Cal.
App. 2d 445, 254 P2d 85 (1953).
44. See note 22 supra.
45. See Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Crane, 55 Ga. App. 573, 600, 190 S.E.
879, 895-96 (1937) (dissenting opinion); PRossga, ToRas § 43, at 215-16 (2d ed.
1955).
46. 104 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
47. 54 Cal. App. 491, 202 Pac. 41 (1921).
48. See note 22 supra.
49. See Belli, supra note 22, at 264; cf. Brown v. Shortledge, 98 Cal. App. 352,
277 Pac. 134 (1929) (tooth knocked out by surgeon's insertion of gag in mouth of
patient; res ipsa loquitur applied).
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of a tooth. Such an accident may thus flow from the surgeon's activities
to protect the patient, rather than from any lack of care on his part."0
The fact that a jawbone is fractured in the course of extracting a tooth
might seem to the layman to suggest negligence on the part of the dentist,
but in Donoho v. Rawbleigh,5 ' testimony by a number of dental surgeons
that the defendant had proceeded in a careful and skillful manner was
sufficient to withstand the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.8 2
Likewise, expert testimony precluded the application of res ipsa loquitur
when plaintiff suffered paralysis following an operation in which a spinal
anaesthesia was used.53
The Borderline Cases
There are certain factual situations in which the courts have divided
as to the applicability of res ipsa loquitur. These cases suggest a fertile
field for expert evidence. For example, where an automobile has suddenly
and unaccountably left the road, some courts have been willing to infer
negligence on the part of the driver 5 while others have not.5  Recent
statistical studies with regard to the cause of automobile accidents might
well be introduced in such cases to determine the appropriateness of res
ipsa58 Similarly conflicting results have been reached in boiler explosion
cases where no specific evidence regarding the cause of the accident is
introduced.5 7 Again experts might be of assistance.
58
50. RAviN INTVI W ; cf. Brown v. Shortledge, supra note 49.
51. 230 Ky. 11, 18 S.W.2d 311 (1929).
52. But cf. Eichholtz v. Poe, 217 S.W. 282 (Mo. 1920) (fact that plaintiff's jaw
was broken while defendant extracted a tooth held sufficient to support a verdict;
res ipsa loquitur not applied by name).
53. Ayers v. Parry, 192 F2d 181 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 980
(1952). But cf. Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955) (res ipsa
loquitur held applicable where injuries resulted from a spinal anaesthesia after testi-
mony of defendants established that plaintiff's injuries were not such as usually happen
when due care is exercised and proper procedure is followed). See also Wallstedt v.
Swedish Hospital, 220 Minn. 274, 19 N.W.2d 426 (1945) (experts established that
lesion on patient's thigh may not have been caused by a hot water bottle as alleged
by plaintiff; res ipsa loquitur held inapplicable). For disapproval of the Wallstedt
case, see Comment, 31 IowA L. Pav. 456 (1946).
54. E.g., Worsham v. Duke, 220 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1955); Reibert v. Thompson,
302 Ky. 688, 194 S.W. 974 (1946).
55. E.g., Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N.Y. 230, 196 N.E. 36 (1935).
56. Such studies indicate that mechanical defects play an insignificant part in
automobile accident causation. One study shows that only 3.5% of all cars involved in
accidents have had known mechanical defects, and in only 0.25% of all cases was it
shown that the defect played a part in causing the accident. See Jones & Dickenson,
Accident Proneniess and Accident Law, 63 HARv. L. Rgv. 769, 770-71 (1950); 17
NACCA L.J. 204, 208-09 (1956).
57. Cases are collected in Annot., 23 A.L.R. 484 (1923). Compare Rose v.
Stevens & Condit Transp. Co., 11 Fed. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1882) (doctrine applicable),
with Bishop v. Brown, 14 Colo. App. 535, 61 Pac. 50 (1900) (doctrine inapplicable) ;
Matthews v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 162 Minn. 313, 320, 202 N.W. 896, 899 (1925)
(same dictum).
58. Such explosions are the result of such things as excess pressure and a weak-
ened boiler. Dr. Goldberg stated that he could not imagine an explosion of a boiler
that was not the result of someone's negligence. GOLDBimO INTZRVImW.
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Another of these areas involves X-ray burn cases. Early cases treated
an X-ray burn as evidence of negligence, and held that res ipsa loquitur
was applicable where a burn followed an X-ray treatment.P9 The trend
of authority has been away from use of the doctrine in these cases,60 though
it is still occasionally met."' Lewis v. Casenburg '2 and Nance v. Hitch 6
present a striking contrast in the use of expert testimony in this area. In the
Lewis case, expert radiologists testified that there was no justification for
the plaintiff's X-ray burn which followed three treatments by the defendant;
they were of the opinion that it was not likely that the burn was due to an
idiosvncracy of the patient. Res ipsa loquitur was held applicable. On the
other hand, res ipsa was held inappropriate in the Nance case following
expert testimony to the effect that an X-ray burn such as that suffered by
the plaintiff might occur notwithstanding the fact that the physician prac-
ticed the highest possible degree of skill and caution. These cases might be
distinguishable on their facts; " it is also possible that knowledge of X-ray
treatments progressed in the twenty-five year period between the two cases
to cause a change in scientific theories regarding such burns. In any
case, they demonstrate the need for expert testimony and the danger in
relying on a general rule regarding res ipsa loquitur in a given area.
Cases involving airplanes and other instrumentalities of air travel
have also yielded inconsistent results in terms of the applicability of res
ipsa loquitur. 0 Much of this confusion, especially in the earlier aviation
cases,7 reflected the lack of knowledge and statistics regarding this rela-
tively new form of transportation.m 8 However, there is now a body of
statistics and scientific knowledge which might be introduced in a par-
59. PRossER, ToRTs § 42, at 211 n.86 (2d ed. 1955); 40 CoLum. L. REv. 161,
164 (1940) ; 13 A.L.R. 1414 (1921) (cases cited therein).
60. PRoSSER, op. cit. supra note 59, § 42 at 211 n.86; Comment, 40 CoLum. L.
Rv. 161, 164 (1940); 57 A.L.R. 268 (1928) (cAses cited therein).
61. Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 329, 355 (1955) (cases cited therein).
62. 157 Tenn. 187, 7 S.W2d 808 (1928).
63. 238 N.C. 1, 76 S.E2d 461 (1953).
64. In the Lewis case, expert testimony established that the burn occurred in a
locality less likely to be burned than other parts of the body. It was also pointed
out that the burn followed the third treatment, and that if it had been due to an
idiosyncracy of the patient, it probably would have occurred sooner.
65. But see discussion in Annot., 57 A.L.R. 268 (1928) (same year as Lewis).
66. Cases are collected in Goldin, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Aviation
Law, 18 So. CALiF. L. Rav. 15 (1945); Annot., 6 A.L.R12d 528 (1949).
67. The earliest aviation cases regarded this form of transportation as inherently
dangerous, and fastened absolute liability upon the aeronaut for all damages caused
by this instrumentality. This trend was only short-lived, however, and aviation acci-
dents are now governed by the theory of liability based on fault. See Goldin, supra
note 66, at 16, 127-28.
68. See Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport, Inc., 278 Mass. 420, 18 N.E. 212
(1932) ; PRossER, ToRTs § 42 (2d ed. 1955) ; Goldin, supra note 66, at 29; Annot., 6
A.L.R2d 528 (1949).
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ticular case to determine the applicability of the doctrine.e9  Statistics
indicate that the causal factors of air accidents are divided about evenly
between human factors and such things as equipment, weather, and terrain.70
Thus, it would seem that the applicability of res ipsa loquitur to aviation
cases should be determined case-by-case, rather than by attempting to
formulate a general rule. In fact, this seems to be the approach of the
courts, but here again they are often asked to apply or reject the doctrine
without the introduction of any informed testimony. Occasionally, how-
ever, expert testimony has been used. In Deojay v. Lyford,7 1 defendant's
plane swerved off-the hard surface of the runway upon which it was landing,
striking and killing plaintiff's intestate. A verdict for. the plaintiff on the
basis of res ipsa loquitur was reversed, the court relying on the testimony
of an experienced aviator that it was quite common for an airplane in the.
process of landing to swerve in such a manner.
One of the most dramatic series of cases involving the applicability
of res ipsar loquitur is that of suits against bottlers for injuries resulting
from the explosion of a bottle containing a carbonated beverage. Some
courts refuse to apply the doctrine in any case of this nature, many of them
basing this conclusion on the theory that the defendant bottler was not in
control of the container at the time of the accident.7 2 On the other hand,
a growing number of courts apply res ipsa to bursting bottle cases when
the plaintiff produces sufficient evidence 73 that the bottle was carefully
69. PRossms, op. cit. supra note 68, § 42 at 203; Goldin, supra note 66, at 31; see
also Smith v. Whitley, 223 N.C. 534, 535, 27 S.E.2d 442, 443 (1943).
70. See CAB, Bum Au op SArm'y, AccmNTs iur UNIED STATEs CIVIL Am
CARRIER AND GENERAL AVIATIO N OPERATIONs, CALENDAR YEAR 1956, at 23-49 (1957) ;
CAA, GENERAL AviAwIoN ACCIDEiS (NoN-AiR CARRIE), CALENDAR YEAR 1956, at
12-16 (1957). These figures may be distorted by the fact that there may be more than
a single causal factor included for one accident. CAB, op. cit. supra at 24.
71. 139 Me. 234, 29A.2d 111 (1942).
72. E.g., Berkens v. Denver Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 109 Colo. 140, 122 P.2d 884
(1942); Loebig's Guardian v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 259 Ky. 124, 81 S.W.2d 910
(1935); Curley v. Ruppert, 272 App. Div. 441, 71 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1st Dep't 1947);
Comment, 2 VILLANOVA L. RZv. 551, 558 (1957); Note, 22 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 128
(1947) ; Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 467 (1949).
It has generally been stated that in order for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
to be applicable, the instrument causing the injury must be under the exclusive control
of the defendant. 2 HARPER & JAMtS § 19.5; MoRRIs at 133; PRossER, op cit, supra
note 68, § 42 at 199; Annot., 169 A.L.R. 953 (1947). This has confused some courts
into refusing to apply the doctrine because control was not literally in the hands
of the defendant at the time of the accident. See PRosss., op. cit. supra note 68,
§ 42 at 205. The better view seems to be that it is sufficient that the defendant had
control at the time that the alleged negligence occurred; this serves to satisfy the
rationale of the control requirement that the negligence of which the thing speaks
is that of the defendant and not of another. 2 HARPER & JAmES §§ 19.7-.8; PRossER,
op. cit. supra note 68, § 42 at 206.
73. For the degree of evidence necessary to satisfy this requirement, see Annot.,
4 A.L.R.2d 467, 472-79 (1949). See also Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.
2d 453, 458, 150 P.2d 436, 439 (1944) : "It is not necessary, of course, that plaintiff
eliminate every remote possibility of injury to the bottle after defendant lost control,
and the requirement is satisfied if there is evidence permitting a reasonable inference
that it was not accessible to extraneous harmful forces and that it was carefully
handled by plaintiff or any third person who may have moved or touched it."
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handled by all persons into whose hands it passed subsequent to the bottler,
and that it was subject to no unusual temperature change after it left his
physical control. 4 The position of these courts does not seem to be based
upon any scientific or statistical study; 7r instead, they seem content to rest
on whatever inference a lay person might draw from such an occurrence.
A few courts that have rejected the doctrine in bottle cases have pointed
out the lack of expert testimony regarding the cause of the bottle's explo-
sion;"8 but for the most part, the courts that have refused to apply the
doctrine have also done so on their own theories of what could cause such
a result.
In a jurisdiction applying res ipsa, the plaintiff typically submits evi-
dence that the explosion occurred, and attempts to prove that the bottle
was carefully handled after it left the bottler's hands; usually, he stops at
this point. The defendant generally rebuts by showing that his bottling
methods are safe, and that the bottles that he uses are of sufficient strength
to withstand an explosion from internal pressure unless grossly mis-
handled; 77 experts are sometimes used by defendants to establish these
pointsYs But defendant's evidence is typically held to be for the trier of
fact rather than for the court to consider," and the plaintiff is given the
advantage of getting the case to a sympathetic jury.
Courts that apply res ipsa loquitur to a bursting bottle case, provided
the plaintiff demonstrates that all persons handling the bottle after it left the
bottler's control did so carefully, proceed on the assumption that the
accident must have been caused by someone's negligence. If the negligence
of all other possible tortfeasors is negated, they reason, then the bottler
must have been negligent.80 This posits that defects in the bottle or in the
74. E.g., Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal. 2d 514, 203 P.2d 522 (1949);
Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Crane, 55 Ga. App. 573, 190 S.E. 879 (1937);
Johnson v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 63 So. 2d 459 (La. Ct. App. 1953);
PRossm, op. cit. supra note 68, § 42 at 204; Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 467, 472-79 (1949).
A third theory allows the question of defendant's negligence to be submitted to
the jury when the plaintiff is able to show substantially similar explosions of de-
fendant's bottled beverage at times proximate to the accident in question. Winfree v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 19 Tenn. App. 144, 83 S.W.2d 903 (1935); see Annot.,
4 A.L.R.2d 467, 468 (1949).
75. See Comment, 1 VAND. L. Rbv. 155, 156 (1947).
76. E.g., Stewart v. Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 50 Ariz. 60, 67, 68 P2d
952, 955 (1937).
77. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436
(1944); Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Crane, 55 Ga. App. 573, 190 S.E. 879
(1937).
78. See, e.g., Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Crane, supra note 77; Dunn v.
Hoffman Beverage Co., 126 N.J.L. 556, 20 A.2d 352 (Ct. Err. & App. 1941); cf. text
at note 108 infra.
79. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d
436, 440 (1944) ; Johnson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 63 So. 2d 459, 462-63 (La. Ct.
App. 1953) ("However, despite all of the testimony of Wright and Dr. Fryer, the
fact remains that the bottle did explode and destroy one of plaintiff's eyes.").
80. Payne v. Rome Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 10 Ga. App. 762, 764, 73 S.E. 1087,
1088 (1911) ; Note, 22 ST. JonN's L. Rxv. 128, 134 (1947) ; see Winfree v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Works, 19 Tenn. App. 144, 149, 83 S.W.2d 903, 906 (1935).
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bottling process 81 must be discoverable or preventable by feasible means; 82
otherwise there is no rational ground for fault liability.83  It is at this point
that expert assistance would appear most desirable. Thus it would be help-
ful for the court to know what reasonable and practical tests are available
to the bottler for testing his product before putting it on the market 8 4 and
how much these tests would reveal. Some courts have themselves sug-
gested tests, the practicality of which should be evaluated. 6 Judging by
the few instances in the cases in which experts have explored these ques-
tions,87 a fertile field for expert testimony appears open.88
81. Defective bottles and excessive carbonation, in that order, appear to be the
two principle causes of bottle explosions. See Meyers v. Alexandria Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 8 So. 2d 737, 739 (La. Ct. App. 1942); Soter v. Griesedieck Western
Brewing Co., 200 Okla. 302, 304, 193 P.2d 575, 577 (1948); GoLDR INTRVMV;
Comment, 2 VILANOVA L. Rxv. 551, 557 (1957).
82. But see Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 460, 150 P.2d 436,
439 (1944).
83. Comment, 2 V.LANOVA L. Rzv. 551, 556-57 (1957).
84. Due care requires that the defendant-bottler subject the bottles to such reason-
able and practical tests as are available to him. Ibid. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 459-60, 150 P.2d 436, 439 (1944) ; Comment, 1 VAND. L. Rzv. 155,
156 (1947).
85. Though not conclusive, evidence of machinery, methods and processes accepted
as standard in the trade would be helpful in establishing what these tests should be.
Comment, 2 VILLANOVA L. Rsv. 551, 556-57 (1957). A tour of the C. Schmidt &
Sons Brewery, Philadelphia, Pa., Nov. 25, 1957, conducted by John McGrath, Assistant
to the Vice-President in charge of Production, revealed at least ten points at which
a defective bottle might be detected. In addition to visual inspection under strong
light at the time the bottles enter the plant, after they are cleaned, and prior to being
packed in cases, bottles are also inspected by machine or visually following the
pasteurization process. Also, there are several other stages at which a defective bottle
is likely to be detected. The bottles are washed upon entering the plant at high
temperatures with caustic soda; this has caused weak bottles to fall apart. In the
filling process, the valve is constructed in such a manner that it will not operate if
the bottle is unable to hold air due to a crack or chip at the neck of the vessel. The
extreme heat and pressure connected with the pasteurization process would also cause a
defective bottle to break. The filled bottles are also treated roughly at three points,
where a defective bottle which had gotten that far would presumably break. The
bottles are dropped a distance of one foot in the process of being loaded into cases.
The cases are arranged mechanically for shipment (palletization), and, finally, the
pallets are trucked down a ramp for a distance of four feet in the process of being
loaded for shipment. According to Mr. McGrath, "A defective bottle just wouldn't
get this far." See also Letter from C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc. to the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, Nov. 4, 1957, on file in the Biddle Law Library (herein-
after cited as ScHrliT LzvrTM).
86. See Comment, 1 VAND. L. Rv. 155, 156 (1947). Many otherwise invisible
stresses and strains in glass can be detected under polaroid light. GOLDBERG IN €RVInW.
Some courts have suggested that this method of inspection must be used by a reason-
ably prudent bottler. However, it is questionable whether this method of testing is
practical for the large scale bottler. GOLDBSRO INTm VI V; SCHMIDT Lnaia. See
Felton, J., dissenting in Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Crane, 55 Ga. App. 573,
602, 190 S.E. 879, 895 (1937) : "To expect 100 per cent perfection in such mass manu-
facture of bottles is to expect a miracle, and to expect a bottler to detect a weakness
in a bottle caused by the rough treatment and other weakening processes, by methods
outside and beyond what was shown to have been done in this case, is to require
an unreasonable and maybe a prohibitive task. The defendant is not an insurer of
the bottle." But see Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal. 2d 514, 517, 203 P.2d 522,
524 (1949): Hoffing v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d 371, 373, 197 P.2d
56, 57 (1948) (experts testified that "polariscope" test was used by bottlers).
87. Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Crane, 55 Ga. App. 573, 190 S.E. 879
(1937) (unsuccessfully); Soter v. Griesedieck Western Brewery Co., 200 Okla. 302,
193 P.2d 575 (1948) (successfully).
88. A few judges have indicated that a bottler should be subject to an absolute
liability as an insurer against his product's exploding. See Traynor, J., concurring in
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THE USE OF EXPERT EVIDENCE OF SPECIFIC CARE OR NEGLIGENCE WHERE
Res Ipsa Loquitur WOULD ORDINARILY BE APPLICABLE
The use of experts in a res ipsa case is not restricted to establishing
that the doctrine should or should not apply. Even though the fact of the
accident suffices to invoke the doctrine, without more the plaintiff can
seldom, if ever, expect a verdict to be directed in his favor.8 9 Both parties
still face the task of convincing the jury to render a favorable verdict.90
Moreover, there is always the chance that the court will refuse to apply
res ipsa, feeling that there is insufficient evidence of defendant's negligence
in the particular case, even though the type of accident that has occurred
would as a rule speak of negligence. Thus, it may be desirable for the
plaintiff, and is a necessity for the defendant, to introduce specific evidence
of care or the lack of it in a case ordinarily calling for the application of
res ipsa loquitur. This may well be in the form of expert evidence.
Use of Specific Expert Evidence by the Plaintiff
There are two reasons why a plaintiff may desire to use expert evi-
dence of specific acts of negligence on the part of the defendant in a res
ipsa loquitur case. Both stem from the fact that although the accident's
occurrence may constitute circumstantial evidence of defendant's negligence,
the inference may not be strong in the particular case. The plaintiff may
wish to introduce evidence of specific negligent acts to strengthen the in-
ference in order to convince the court that res ipsa loquitur is properly
applicable. This is particularly desirable where there is no res ipsa prec-
edent in the jurisdiction in the type of case involved. The second reason
for introducing evidence of specific acts of negligence is that even though
the court will invoke the doctrine, such evidence may help to convince the
jury of the defendant's negligence.
Unfortunately, however, this course exposes plaintiff to a possible
pitfall. Although it is doubtful that it is a clear rule in any jurisdiction,
there are dicta and holdings to the effect that a plaintiff who introduces
evidence of specific negligence on the defendant's part cannot avail himself
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.91 Two similar cases emphasize the
Escola Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944). This
was at one time the law in Missouri. Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 307 Mo. 520,
271 S.W. 497 (1927). But this doctrine was repudiated in Maybach v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp., 359 Mo. 446, 222 S.W.2d 87 (1949). Yet, it is probable that res ipsa
has been applied in at least some of these cases primarily as a result of a feeling on
the part of the judges that a bottler whose product has caused an injury should lose
at least some of the defendant's normal procedural advantages. See Prosser, Res
Ipsca Loquitur in California, 37 CALIr. L. Rzv. 183, 224 (1949).
89. MoRRIs at 135-36.
90. See note 11 supra.
91. See, e.g., Goodheart v. American Airlines, Inc., 252 App. Div. 660, 1 N.Y.S.2d
288 (2d Dep't 1938) ; Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur it Catifornia, 37 CALWf. L. RV.
183, 213-14 (1949) ; 9 BRO0KLYiN L. Rv. 335, 340 (1940); Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 791
(1954).
This reluctance of the courts to permit plaintiff to avail himself of the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur once he has introduced specific evidence of defendant's negligence
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point. In Killian v. Logan,92 res ipsa loquitur was held applicable where
plaintiff sustained injuries as a result of a malfunctioning fire escape; no
direct evidence was offered by the plaintiff as to the condition of the ap-
paratus. 3 In Francisco v. Miller,94 the doctrine was held inapplicable in
an almost identical factual situation after the plaintiff introduced expert
testimony that the structure had been weakened by corrosion.95
This limitation of res ipsa loquitur has been justifiably criticized, for
it would seem that specific evidence of defendant's fault is not necessarily
inconsistent with the doctrine. As long as the specific evidence merely
narrows the range of possible negligent acts, leaving an inference of negli-
gence still to be drawn in support of the specific proof, such evidence
supplements rather than supplants the doctrine.9 6 In addition, courts
have occasionally refused to apply res ipsa on the theory that sufficient
expert testimony of defendant's negligence was available and should have
been used by plaintiff. For example, where the motor of plaintiff's car
exploded after he used defendant's product "Motor-Tune-Up" according
to directions, the court refused to invoke the doctrine, stating that plain-
tiff should have procured a chemical analysis of the product and produced
the results before the court.97 The court also noted plaintiff's failure to
introduce testimony describing the condition of the motor after the explo-
sion. In Bishop v. Brown 98 the court refused to apply res ipsa in a bursting
boiler case on the grounds that plaintiff should have submitted the fragments
of the boiler to tests of tensility and ductility and that the accident alone
was insufficient to indicate that defendant was negligent.99
There are, of course, many cases in which the plaintiff has been per-
mitted to avail himself of both res ipsa loquitur and expert testimony of
defendant's specific acts of negligence,'DO at least where the evidence does
has a dual basis. Some courts justify the reluctance on the ground of waiver or
estoppel. Others state that res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine to be used only when
absolutely necessary, and that proof of defendant's specific acts of negligence ends
that necessity. Cases cited in Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 791 (1954).
It is clear that res ipsa loquitur cannot be applied when the evidence in the case
clearly and positively reveals all the facts and circumstances surrounding the oc-
currence and definitely establishes the precise cause of the plaintiff's injury. Ibid.
See also 9 BRooKLYN L. R~v. 335 (1940).
92. 115 Conn. 437, 162 Atl. 30 (1932).
93. Id. at 440, 162 At. at 32.
94. 14 N.J. Super. 290, 81 A2d 803 (App. Div. 1951).
95. Id. at 294, 81 A.2d at 805; Brief for Appellant, id. at p. 3. It should be noted,
however, that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may have been inapplicable due to de-
fendant's lack of control. Defendant had just taken control of the premises from a
prior owner when the accident occurred. See note 72 supra.
96. See PRossuR, ToRTs § 43, at 211 (2d ed. 1955); Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 791, 795
(1954).
97. Kramer v. R. M. Hollingshead Corp., 5 N.J. 386, 75 A.2d 861 (1950). The
decision also rested upon lack of control on the part of defendant.
98. 14 Colo. App. 535, 61 Pac. 50 (1900).
99. Id. at 543-45, 61 Pac. at 53-55.
100. E.g., Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc., 192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 945 (1952); D'Arcy v. Westchester Elec. Ry., 82 App. Div. 263, 81
N.Y. Supp. 952 (1st Dep't 1903) ; see PRossXR, op. cit. supra note 96, § 43 at 214;
Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 791, 795 (1954).
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not show so precisely the cause of injury as to leave no inference to be
drawn.' Thus in several bursting bottle cases successful plaintiffs relied
both upon the doctrine and evidence that there were feasible tests of inspec-
tion which defendant failed to utilize.' °2 In Lewis v. Casenburg'0o the
testimony of a roentgenologist to the effect that defendant did not exercise
due care when he failed to examine plaintiff before exposing him to X-ray
treatments from which the latter suffered burns helped to support a verdict
based partially upon res ipsa loquitur.
Since the decisions even in a single state may be inconsistent, 0 4 it
would seem that a plaintiff would best refrain from introducing specific
evidence of defendant's negligence where the inference raised by the res
ipsa loquitur doctrine is strong. On the other hand, where the doctrine
presents at best a shaky inference of negligence to judge or jury, and
specific evidence of defendant's negligence is strong, defendant might be
well advised to introduce the latter evidence even at the risk of losing the
benefit of res ipsa.0 5
Use of Specific Expert Evidence by the Defendant
Even though defendant is unable to rebut the general proposition that
an accident such as has occurred is ordinarily the product of negligence,
he may be able to produce expert proof that the occurrence in this instance
could not have resulted from his lack of due care. Occasionally, such
evidence may be so strong as to warrant a directed verdict; ID" even if it
fails to do so, it still may forestall an unfavorable verdict. Or it may lead
the court to refuse to submit the case to the jury under the res ipsa
doctrine.'
0 7
Defendant may sometimes attempt to prove through experts that he
exercised due care in constructing, maintaining, or operating the instru-
mentality which caused the accident. Such evidence seldom is sufficient to
overcome the inference of fault, and has the added disadvantage that it may,
by indicating possible causes of the occurrence, make the jury wonder why
proper precautions were in fact not taken in the case at hand, since although
potential causes of the accident were known, it nonetheless did occur.
08
101. See note 91 supra.
102. Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal. 2d 514, 203 P.2d 522 (1949) ; Escola
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944); Hoffing v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d 371, 197 P.2d 56 (1948).
103. 157 Tenn. 187, 7 S.W.2d 808 (1928).
104. Compare the Francisco case, with Meny v. Carlson, 6 N.J. 82, 77 A.2d 245
(1950) and Cleary v. Camden, 118 N.J.L. 215, 192 Atl. 29 (Sup. Ct. 1937), aff'd, 119
N.J.L. 387, 196 Atl. 455 (Ct. Err. & App. 1938). See Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in
California, 37 CAr..ip. L. Rxv. 183, 213 (1949) ; Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 791, 794 (1954).
105. See 2 HAX'za & JAmts § 19.6, at 1082-83 & n.12.
106. See, e.g., Scarpelli v. Washington Water Power Co., 63 Wash. 18, 114 Pac.
870 (1911) ; Prosser, supra note 104, at 227.
107. See La Porte v. Houston, 33 Cal. 2d 167, 199 P.2d 665 (1948).
108. See Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Crane, 55 Ga. App. 573, 581, 190 S.E.
879, 884 (1937) ; 2 HARPER & JAmES § 19.12, at 1105 (1956) ; Prosser, supra note 104,
at 22&
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However, defendant's specific evidence may be effectively directed at
proving one of two propositions: (1) that this particular accident was not
the fault of anyone, or (2) that the accident was due to the negligence
of some third party. In the first instance, defendant may prove lack of
negligence on his own part through expert evidence that the accident was
due to an undiscoverable or unavoidable mechanical defect. Thus, in
Banner Laundry Co. v. Great Eastern Cas. Co.,10 9 the court was able to
avoid ruling upon the applicability of res ipsa loquitur in a bursting boiler
case,110 but instead directed a verdict for plaintiffs "I on the basis of expert
proof that the explosion was due to a bent safety valve and could not have
been foreseen nor prevented." 2  Similarly, in La Porte v. Houston,"3 res
ipsa loquitur was held inapplicable when defendant-mechanic introduced
expert testimony that the car he was working on, and which suddenly
lurched forward and injured plaintiff-owner, may have done so as a result
of a mechanical defect."
4
Defendant might also use expert evidence to prove that the accident
was the result of the negligence of some other person. Thus, in Redmond
v. Ouachita Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,"6 the trial court's application of res
ipsa loquitur was reversed, the defendant having introduced testimony of a
professor of chemical engineering, a graduate chemist, and a professor
of physics, to the effect that the fracture pattern of the bottle that injured
plaintiff indicated that it broke due to some external impact and not as the
result of internal pressure." 6
Finally, there are some instances in which the courts appear to have
used res ipsa loquitur as a deliberate instrument of policy to place the de-
fendant in the position of being virtually an insurer." 7 In these cases, de-
fendant's expert testimony may have some value in influencing the jury to
return a smaller award of damages.
CONCLUSION
Although grounded in common sense, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
has sometimes been abused by judges who have been guided by their own
predilections, not based upon scientific fact, in determining the applicability
109. 148 Minn. 29, 180 N.W. 997 (1921).
110. See text and note at note 57 supra.
111. Res ipsa loquitur was raised by defendant insurance company by way of a
defense to an action by the insureds on a glass policy. The glass was shattered by
the explosion, but the policy excluded losses caused by the negligence of the insured.
112. 148 Minn. at 32-33, 180 N.W. at 998-99.
113. 33 Cal. 2d 167, 199 P.2d 665 (1948).
114. Accord, Genero v. Ewing, 176 Wash. 78, 28 P.2d 116 (1934) (runaway
plane; expert testimony that defendant used due care, and that accident was due to an
unforeseeable mechanical defect); see also Kramer v. R. M. Hollingshead Corp.,
5 N.J. 386, 75 A.2d 861 (1950) (expert evidence that defendant's solvent which
allegedly caused an explosion was subsequently tested and found to be harmless).
115. 76 So. 2d 553 (La. Ct. App. 1954).
116. Such proof may be difficult to obtain. See Comment, 2 VILLANOvA L. RI.v.
551, 559 (1957).
117. See Prosser, supra note 104, at 224. For a discussion of such instances in
the bursting bottle situation, see note 88 supra.
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of the doctrine. With the increased accuracy of scientific and statistical
research, which has been a product of the technological advances of the
past few decades, the time has come to modernize trial methods in res ipsa
loquitur cases. Expert evidence in many fields can be used advantageously
by the plaintiff to convince the court that the thing really does speak for
itself, and hence that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should be applied. Or
the plaintiff might profitably produce expert testimony of specific acts of
defendant's negligence to reinforce the res ipsa doctrine, although this
course of action poses the danger that the doctrine may be held not to be
applicable." 8 Conversely, a defendant confronted with a res ipsa loquitur
case might introduce expert evidence to show that an occurrence such as
that upon which plaintiff's suit is based is not necessarily indicative of negli-
gence on the part of anyone. Where the situation so warrants, the defend-
ant might also introduce scientific, statistical, or other expert testimony of
his own due care. Evidence of this nature might be directed primarily
at convincing the judge that the doctrine should or should not apply; once
res ipsa is invoked such evidence will also help the trier of facts determine
whether or not the defendant was negligent in the particular case. Where
res ipsa is rejected, if the case should nonetheless reach the jury on some
other ground, expert evidence of specific acts of care or negligence on the
part of defendant will have a similar effect.
Some advocates and courts have recognized the need for a more
scientific approach to res ipsa loquitur cases, and have adjusted to it. Un-
fortunately, these cases illustrate the exception rather than the rule. It
is to be hoped, however, that other courts will follow their enlightened lead.
B.I.B.
118. See text at note 92 supra.
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